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Abstract
The significance of VC as a component of the 'Silicon Valley' model of high tech has led many countries during the 80s and 90s to implement government policies aimed at stimulating this activity.
This paper suggests that a major factor in the failure of many of these policies to create an early phase, high tech SU(Start Up) oriented VC industry was the simplistic attitude of policy makers who viewed VC as a 'pool of capital'. The alternative 'VC as an industry' view adopted in this paper explicitely considers issues of VC organization, capabilities, strategy and institutions. An analysis of their impact on VC policy requires considering the context & timing of policy implementation; and the links between VC and VC policies on the one hand and high tech and high tech cluster policies on the other.
The new approach focuses on the process of creation of the new industry ("VC Emergence") and on targeted VC emergence policies which are significantly more complex than the VC-directed policies suggested in the literature. Moreover success necessitates adoption of a systems/evolutionary perspective to Innovation & Technology Policies in general and to VC-directed policies in particular.
The successful emergence of a VC industry in Israel during the 90s was not a 'pure' market-led process, rather it was triggered by a targeted VC directed policy/program (Yozma), implemented during 1993-98. The incentives structure & timing of this program as well as other elements in its design stimulated entry both of high quality domestic managers/ entrepreneurs (many of them with prior high tech experience) and of reputable, capable and networked investors from abroad. Both groups provided significant added value to the emerging VC industry and hi-tech cluster. Moreover by successfully dealing with the 'system failures' associated with achieving critical mass, collective learning, and other processes associated with the emergence or transformation of high tech clusters-Yozma (the Israeli VC targeted policy program) facilitated an extremely rapid and efficient process of VC emergence based on co-evolutionary and other cumulative processes It also assured a pattern of investment which followed a strict definition of VC (dominance of early stage investments in pure high tech SU).
Based on the Israeli case and on information on the U.S's experience, the paper presents an Industry Life Cycle (ILC) model of VC industry evolution. The model contains five distinctive phases with VC emergence being preceded by two phases (background conditions & a pre-emergence) and being followed by the remaining two (crisis & restructuring; and consolidation). Our analysis suggests that a successful process of VC emergence does not by itself assure industry sustainability. Additional restructuring & reconfiguration processes would be required, frequently in response to a post emergence crisis caused by late emergence overshooting.
Despite the enhanced complexity of VC policy, the experience from Yozma suggests that Targeted VC (directed) policies are possible and could be successful; and that their likelihood of success depends on a successful policy-high tech co-evolutionary process which in Israel started two decades before implementation. It also suggests that VC emergence policies in certain countries could contribute to high tech industry and to the emergence of new high tech clusters.
. 
Introduction & Objectives
This paper deals with policies promoting Venture Capital oriented to the financing and support of seed & early phase high tech SU companies (a 'strict VC definition). In the context of an 'Industry Life Cycle Model' of VC industry evolution based on the classical Product Life Cycle model of the literature (Abernathy & Utterback 1978; Klepper 1996) , it focuses, although not exclusively, on targeted programs directed to VC Emergence. The motivation originated from an analysis of the Yozma Program ('Yozma') which was successfully implemented during and which triggered the Emergence of Israel's VC industry (A&T 2002a,b) . In previous work we argue that the objective of this program was to promote a domestic (infant) industry rather than the generation of 'a pool of capital'. This was reflected in the program's design where both promotion of appropriate forms of VC organizationthe LP form which prevailed in Silicon Valley-and promotion of learning figure prominently. Moreover the Upside incentives offered both stimulated entry of professional and highly skilled VC managers who would readily focus on early phase investments in SU; and value adding foreign investors. The incentives offered by Yozma contrast with the tax benefits to investors & risk sharing mechanisms which were common in other VC promotion programs at the time (OECD 1996 (OECD , 2003a .
No less important for the success of Yozma were the timing and context of its implementation. Israel's VC industry did not arise in a vacuum; rather it evolved form a prior setting of high tech and R&D/innovation capabilities-yet another policy led process spanning the two decades which preceded emergence of the new industry.
That experience suggests that a VC-directed incentives' program should not represent the central thrust of Government policy directed to create a completely new high tech sector (Gelvan & Teubal 1997) . Rather a VC industry may be socially desirable once high tech industry has developed and achieved a certain size and strength.
The special features and relative success 1 of VC policies in Israel and the problems encountered elsewhere in the development of an early phase VC industry 2 suggest that other countries may benefit from that country's experience. Despite our 1 'Relative' since Israel's VC industry has not yet consolidated and passed the test of 'sustainability'. 2 Israel's VC (broad definition including PE) investments during the 1998-2001 period as a share of GDP were the highest in OECD countries (1.3%) -higher than the UK, Sweden and the US. In the year 2000 a full 1% of GDP was invested by domestic VC companies only. Moreover, over 50% of these investments were in early stage firms (OECD 2003d ), more than double or triple the share in other OECD countries. For most OECD countries, the GDP share of early stage investments in 1998 was less than 0.1% (OECD 2003, in progress) .
beleif that the Israeli experience is not replicable in toto elsewhere, specific aspects of the experience may be useful to other countries. Moreover, a number of policy issues, which arise from the Isaeli experience & are analyzed in this paper could be quite valuable to researchers and policy makers elsewhere.
Research on Venture Capital Policy
The extensive VC literature 3 is testimony that significant progress has been made in understanding the operation and impact of VC. This contrasts with research on VC policy, which has been much less extensive, more descriptive than analytical, and less successful in generating new knowledge. It is our belief that part of the problem resides in the policies implemented themselves-their simplistic underlying assumptions and their weak impact, both of which explain why no satisfactory conceptual framework has yet been developed for analyzing policy 4 . It also is the reason why an analysis of Israel's successful Yozma program could enhance our knowledge about the conditions for successful VC policies.
Public policy aimed at stimulating venture capital was significant in the earlymid 1980's when several OECD European countries implemented VC-directed policies. Most of these focused on the supply side-how to increase the pool of VC capital available through a combination of three sets of measures: 1) Direct Government investments (in private VCs or in SU); 2) Tax and other incentives to private sector investments in VC (capital gain taxes, government guarantees, etc); and 3) regulatory changes principally affecting Pension and Insurance funds. Most reviews of policy, divert little attention to the stimulation of "demand" (quantity & quality of SU companies); or to issues of VC organization, strategy or capabilities.
Neither did they link the development of VC with the development of high tech clusters. One exception to the supply side bias was Poterba (1989) who examined how and whether capital gain taxation influenced the growth of VC in the US. He examines both the supply side -pool of capital to VC funds; and the demand sidethe motivation of individuals to become entrepreneurs and to join startup firms. Proof that VC was not considered an 'industry' by most researchers in the field is given by the fact that no serious attention was given to measures to attract professional high quality VC managers/ firms into the VC industry and valued adding investors, despite the strong supply inelasticity in their generation (Gompers & Lerner 1999, Ch. 1) .
By the late 1980's and early 1990's the scant success of such programs in developing an early stage, high tech & SU oriented, VC industry led to a generalized disappointment with VC policies in general. Florida et al. (1990 Florida et al. ( , 1994 argued that government programs aimed at developing national VC industries or VC in specific states of the U.S. failed. This failure was related to the fact that VC investments flow mainly to established-high-tech centers regardless of the geographical location of the VC industry-a fact which means that it has a weak impact in regions without established high tech clusters 5 .
Most Government policies still assumed that VC was a 'pool of money' and this led in the late 80s and early 90s to pessimistic policy conclusions or to simplistic prescriptions to promote exit mechanisms. For example, in an early 90s report to the EU showing that modern, effective VC exit mechanisms did not exist in Europe; no neither significant nor far reaching policy conclusion was arrived at (Coopers at el. 1995) . With the exception of some reference to the need of developing intermediaries in Europe and to further develop angel networks, the underlying framework of analysis did not consider structural and organizational elements. While the focus on taxation issues, strengthening of networks & information flows and standardization of evaluation criteria, are important they did not go to the core of the problem of developing a sophisticated VC industry e.g. the widespread absence of large numbers of quality, high growth SU and high quality VC agents. The limited and pessimistic policy implications and the weak impact of policy caused most researchers during the 1990's to largely ignore policy 6 .
A conclusion from a review of the literature till the mid 90s and from a study of policy and VC emergence since is that "success" in VC policy requires a broader & better integrated set of programs and institutional changes, not all directed at all times to VC but also to the domestic high tech cluster (R&D, SU, capital markets) and even to other areas. Once Venture capital is considered an industry rather than just a pool of capital, its focus will shift to the identification of the market & system failures Despite the above and despite the fact that some recent policy-related research in the field takes into consideration both VC demand and VC supply, most of existing research on VC policies still ignores issues of VC organization & capabilities; how to attract professionals to the VC industry; how to stimulate cumulative learning; and the role of cluster dynamics. 7 In the mid 90's few countries tried to triggered the VC industry through the creation of Equity markets for innovative SU following NASDAQ example such as EASDAQ, JASDAQ and SASDAQ.
8 Other research such as that of Lerner (1999) and Gans & Stern (2003) focused on support of early stage R&D in SU in the context of their analysis of the successful SBIR program in the US. In addition, Lerner (1998 Lerner ( , 2002 examined other issues related to government policy in the area of funding entrepreneurial activity. Rather than considering subsidies as another form of Government Venturing activity, we propose that direct subsidies to SU should be considered as complementary (or VCrelevant/related) actions to Government VC policies. For example, R&D grants to business firms in Israel, through a number of distinct dynamic processes, set the base for the subsequent emergence of a VC industry. Moreover, they were contemporaneous to and complemented the Yozma program. 9 Israel's strong domestic early stage VC industry is linked to the US VC industry for mezzanine and late stage finance of Israeli SUs and therefore to the US IPO market. These links enabled Israel's VC industry to exist in the absence of a significant domestic IPO market.
Recent Research on Israel's Venture Capital Industry
In recent work (A&T 2003a,b) 
Objectives of Paper
We showed that the emergence of Israel's Venture Capital industry could be visualized as a path dependent process involving a broad set of economic, societal and even geopolitical factors-some endogenous & some exogenous-spanning 2-3 decades. Previous work did not cover the post VC emergence period and some important issue of the VC emergence process and of post crisis restructuring & consolidation. Moreover, the narrative was not explicitely cast within an Industry Life Cycle framework, which seems to be the right framework for comparing the dynamics of VC industry formation and development across countries. 
Background and Context
New National Priorities emerged in Israel with the beginnings of the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union during the early 90s. The Government began searching for means to employ the thousands of engineers that came to this country. Simultaneously the Military Industries had laid-off hundreds of engineers; and many startup companies were created only to subsequently fail. In fact an official report (Jim report, 1987) mentions that 60% of the technologically successful OCSapproved projects failed to raise additional capital for marketing and had to close the business. This suggests both a capital gap and the absence of sufficient marketing capabilities 13 .
Officials in the treasury and the OCS realized that despite massive Government support for R&D there were clear 'market & system failures', which blocked the successful creation and development of Startup companies. This was related, not only to insufficient sources of R&D follow-up finance but also to weak management abilities, business know how and non market-directed developments.
It was clear that a shift in policy objectives gradually took place-from promotion of R&D to enhancement of SU formation, survival and growth. The head of OCS, Yigal Erlich, pondered about how to make OCS support more effective. He could not find even one real success "similar to those we see today" (interviews 1998, 2000) .
The basic problem was lack of capability to grow after the product development phase. He identified 'finance' and 'marketing/management' (skills & approach) as the weak links in the system; and eventually he believed that the way to overcome these deficiencies was to foster a domestic Venture Capital industry.
A First Attempt: Inbal
The 
The Design of Yozma
The designing of the Yozma program was an outcome of a very long and Another major point was the pursuing of an aggressive investment policy, spearheaded by Yozma Venture Fund.
Yozma Fund started operating in 1993 and was privatized in 1998, the total capital raised by its' funds was $250M and they invested in over 250 SU companies.
Box1 below summarizes the main features of Yozma's design. 
Yozma Impact
The Israeli data show a quantum jump in VC activity and high tech exports after
Yozma. This and the insights received and statements made during our interviews ( 
Comparing Yozma with Inbal
A comparison of Yozma and Inbal will further emphasize the crucial role Yozma's design (box 2). Yozma's design played a crucial role in explaining its differential performance (box 3) since both programs had almost similar goals; their date of initiation differed by only one year; with 5 years overlap in implementation. No explicit limit (neither time nor money) to the number of funds that could enjoy the INBAL benefit.
The program was designed and implemented by the OCS who was skilled in promoting high tech industries. It was a consensual outcome of an interactive policy process, which included the Treasury, the private sector and foreign investors.
The program was designed and implemented by the Treasury who had no specific hi tech knowledge & who emphasized financial rather than 'real' aspects. Presumed limited interaction with relevant stakeholders; and a more limited consensus among all interested parties. Strong incentive to collective learning, to VC cooperation, and to 'learning from others' (through requirement of having a reputable foreign financial institution)
No incentive to collective learning, to learning from others or to VC cooperation (legal limitations to cooperation). 
An Industry Life Cycle model of the Evolution of VC Industry
An Industry Life Cycle model is a particular variant and extension of the classical PLC model (Abernathy & Utterback 1978 , Klepper 1996 . In our opinion this model is the most suitable framework for the theoretical analysis of an industry's evolution. It includes both aspects of dynamic/evolutionary processes and of institutional perspectives (including issues of organizational capabilities). Our Industry Life Cycle framework differs from conventional ones in three main aspects: first it will consider one specific industry with unique characteristics-the VC industry; second, it is on the one hand more detailed and on the other a less formal/theoretical model than Klepper's models; and it starts prior to the industry emergence and consists of five well determined phases of evolution. This contrasts with Abernathy & Utterback's three phases and Klepper's dynamic analysis which both began after emergence or ignore it. From a wider perspective our Industry Life
Cycle model when applied to VC in a country were High Tech is a dominant sector is linked to the analysis of Technological Revolutions (Freeman & Peres 1988 , Peres 2003 .
Phases in the Evolution of VC Industry
The first step in developing our conceptual model is determining the generic phases of VC industry evolution and their main characteristics. Box 4 lists the five phases in VC evolution which follow from an Industry Life Cycle framework of analysis as applied to Venture Capital. Box 5 presents their main characteristics as emerging from a detailed analysis of the Israeli and US cases 17 .
A major aspect of our analysis of the VC industry life cycle is identifying the beginning of the industry. This and the related issues of when a market is created are complex and controversial, and our purpose here is not to thoroughly solve these issues. For our purpose we state that the industry is established during the third, VC emergence phase. By that time a measure of stability in major, broad characteristics has been achieved. VC emergence (phase 3, 1993 (phase 3, -2000 begins with a fluid sub-phase (1993 followed by an accelerated rapid growth process (1996-1998 in Israel) that eventually leads to overshooting ( -2000 . This overshooting has similarities to the natural overinvestment in the VC industry cycle (Lerner, 2002) but also has additional components related to Long Waves & Technological
Revolutions (Peres 2003). The fourth Crisis & Restructuring phase encompasses not
only the VC industry but the whole high tech cluster and in some cases the whole economy-especially in those where SU represent a high share of total activity. It can only be overcome through a long and painful process of restructuring & adaptation 17 In Box 5 we further extend the analysis performed in AKT 2003. 18 The Israeli case also suggests the need for a well developed ITP 'infrastructure' of capabilities and institutions.
and through a new pattern of interaction & links between high tech and the rest of the economy. As in the US case, policy is likely to play an important role in the successful restructuring of VC industries and in the subsequent Consolidation (phase 5). By then, the core of the industry will consist of those VCs that survived the crisis.
This last phase will also be characterized by a relatively stable set of VC strategic groups (defined by capabilities, strategy and performance) and by VC industry sustainability (Avnimelech, 2003) .
Box 4: Phases in the Evolution of the Israeli and the U.S. VC Industries
Phase (sub Phase) in VC Evolution Period-Israel Peeriod- US Background Conditions 1970 -88 1930 -45 Pre-Emergence 1989 -92 1946 -57 Emergence (Fluid, Growth, Overshooting) 1993 -2000 • Creation of High Tech Industry and R&D/ Innovation capabilities;
• Concern for the financing of SME not necessarily high tech SU.
• Almost no formal VC activity; limited informal VC activity • Growing Acceptance of technological entrepreneurship
PRE-EMERGENCE PHASE
• A Technological Revolution which assures a continued stream of new business opportunities for SU • Mechanisms for supporting SME and / or SU • Growth of informal VC e.g. angels; and of VC-related activities • Overshooting leads to a deep crisis characterized by the drying-out of the sources of capital and by a shakeout of companies • A new set of institutions (formal and informal) emerge and a new set of policies are implemented • The VC industry restructures; the restructuring may be more or less.
• Success depends on the new industry structure; the institutional framework; the high tech cluster interaction with other industries; and the new set of policies implemented.
• The major effect is Sustainability of the VC industry: the enhanced capacity to overcome crises in the future * based on the US and Israel's experience (AKT 2003) 
VC Emergence
From the Industry life Cycle perspective presented here, VC emergence is the central process in the evolution of the VC industry. Contrary to the conventional PLC perspective which implicitly assumes that an industry exists with its first firm, the central question asked once a Background Conditions & a Pre-Emergence phase are added to the theory is whether these will assure that the industry in question will be created. This issue is even more pressing from a VC policy perspective since, as mentioned above, the objective is not an increase in VC per se but whether policy has led to the creation of an early stage and high tech oriented VC industry.
VC emergence is a process rather than a state of affairs at a moment of time-an outcome both of the accumulation of market & policy experience ('variation') during the pre-emergence phase and of other factors. As mentioned it has three sub-phases. Associations, specialized attorneys, etc.). It also converges to a relatively stable distribution of strategies (in Israel, a strong focus on 'early phase' investment), routines (Nelson & Winter 1982) and organization forms. As long as external and internal conditions remained unchanged, the VC industry (and the wider high tech cluster) supports the creation and growth of large numbers of new SU.
VC Emergence in Israel
We already mentioned that VC emergence in Israel was triggered by Yozma who, during 1993-7, invested $100M of Government money which was divided into 10 hybrid, daughter funds ('Yozma Funds') and one Government-owned VC (Yozma Venture Fund). It leveraged an additional $150M mostly from private, reputable & networked, institutions and corporations from abroad and Israel. This initial infusion of funds was invested in 250-300 SU companies.
The above infusion of capital triggered a cumulative process with positive feedback were more and more profitable VC activity 'today' spurred even more and more profitable VC activity 'tomorrow' (see Figures 1&2) . At the center of this process was VC-SU co-evolution (see next section (Klepper 1996) also allows for cumulativeness resulting from entry of new firms into the industry. In his model new entrants introduce new product innovations which, while initially serving a new segment of users, are subsequently diffused to the whole industry and market. Thus entry is associated with increased demand and collective learning. In the VC industry this would mean that VC entry would stimulate SU entry and lead to collective learning of VC companies. 22 This has been a major concern of policy makers whenever 'direct' policies involving Government VC investments were involved (OECD 1997) . The advantage of an Industry Life cycle perspective is that it shows that, under certain conditions and by virtue of cumulativeness, a successful VC emergence process might involve strong 'dynamic' complementarities between Government and Private investments.; or alternatively the absence of direct Government investments may be the 'cause' of a low level of private investment. This possibility is one 'analytical' difference between the ILC perspctive to a VC industry and a VC 'pool of capital' perspective (a neo-classical perspective).
expected from the neoclassical perspective. This non-neoclassical perspective to industry emergence increases considerably the potential scope and role of Government VC policy, although it also highlights a previously unsuspected level of complexity in the design, timing & implementation of such policies.
Differences between Israel and the U.S.
Box 6 summarizes the main differences between two patterns of VC evolution involving 'successful' VC emergence-the U.S. The main difference between the US and Israel concerns the role of policy in VC emergence although in both countries policy played important roles (some of them indirect). VC emergence in Israel was policy led since it was the result of a deliberate, targeted policy, which, by virtue of its scope, was clearly the dominant factor in the creation of that critical mass which triggered a cumulative process of growth. In contrast to this the US's SBIC program was not directed to VC but to SME's (a priority of the Federal Government) and its direct effect on the process of emergence was presumably not the dominant one. In the U.S. VC emergence was market led in the sense a) that only some SBICs founded as a result of the SBIC program were VCs although other VCs were founded by spin-offs from SBICs; and b) due to the (presumed) dominance of market forces not benefiting from SBIC's incentives in triggering a cumulative process of growth 23 .
Another very important difference is that the US's VC industry has already been 
VC Crisis & Restructuring and Illustration from Israel
There are two different concepts of VC industry crisis: a domestic crisis associated with the evolution of the industry-emergence crisis; and a global investment crisis flowing from global capital market cycles-cycle downturn. The first, which is relevant to our Industry Life Cycle model, is a consequence of the industry having achieved a certain size & age and having become a strategic industry (Nelson 1984) . At this point the industry cannot any more operate independently of the wider economy and social system. This System Fitness crisis occurs once in the development of the industry (prior to Consolidation). The second concept of crisis is linked to the empirically observed overinvestment in specific technologies (bubble) and is a process that repeats itself every few years. Gompers and Lerner (1999) identified 3 such crises between 1978 and 1995 and one ending in 2002 (Lerner 2003 figure 1) . The anomaly of strong high tech performance and relatively weak economic growth performance reflects a bias against mid & low tech industry and to some extent against non-R&D aspects of growth (Teubal 1999) . This is reflected in total factor productivity data where most calculations show that it 25 Evergreen for example raised 140 M$ in Q3 2003 and Pitango who, one month after announcing the beginning of a campaign to raise 300M$, already had commitments for 50M$. 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 ICT Rest
Virtuous Co-Evolutionary Processes
The variables influencing VCs ILC are related among themselves within and across phases. They form links and co-evolutionary chains which may underpinn VC evolution within specific phases or cause the transition from one phase to the next.
They also could reflect links with other sectors of the economy. Identification of these links and co-evolutionary chains could therefore contribute to the analysis of 'causes' of a particular profile of VC evolution. For this reason, an analysis of co-evolutionary processes should be part of the ILC framework of analysis. Nelson (1994) has traced the co-evolution between an industry and the institutions supporting it. In this paper Source: CBS 2001 we trace three co-evolutionary processes: Finance-High Tech co-evolution; VC-SU co-evolution (most significant at the emergence phase) and ITP-High Tech coevolution. The last is consistent with our view that VC emergence in Israel was policy-led.
VC-High Tech & Finance-High Tech Co-Evolution
The development of high tech is linked and might co-evolve with the development of those financial institutions which loan, underwrite, invest or perform other financial services to or in relation to the industry. Moreover after VC emergence high tech or segments of this industry will co-evolve with Venture Capital. tech 'push' is also an important relevant factor (see A&T2003d) 28 .
In addition to high tech pushing and pulling VC -the VC industry, once in existence, pushes high tech, particularly its SU segment (during the 90s in Israel). At this point point VC-high tech co-evolution is closely linked to VC-SU co-evolution.
27 There always will be other SU founded by returning Israelis or by recent graduates from Universities. However SU founded by spin-offs of existing high tech companies presumably will be playing important roles in the future industry (see Klepper 2002) . Thus prior experience in a sophisticated domestic company is also the source of important management skills and capabilities both for new SU. It is also important for new VC entrants. 28 As shown above in the Israeli case, these two processes were not enough to cause VC industry emergence: a targeted VC-directed program ("Yozma") was also required This adds an element of policy driven (rather than high tech sector driven) push to the creation of the Venture Capital industry. 
Figure 4: The co-evolution of VC and High tech industries (M$)

4.2VC-SU Co-evolution
VC-SU co-evolution bears a similarity to supply-demand links fueled by product innovation, interactive learning and excess profits in new markets/industries. High profits in the short-term resulting from 'excess demand' (sub-period 3) will induce new industry entrants and a corresponding shift in the supply curve. Due to cumulative and cluster effects they will not necessarily reduce profits, at least for a time. Also users learn from producers and viceversa so for a time both supply and demand curves are shifting. In this VC-SU co-evolution resembles the user-producer 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
ITP -High Tech Co-Evolution
A virtuous ITP-High Tech co-evolutionary process requires that the Government identify SF and craft an adequate policy response; and that business/high tech (and other components of the system) adapt, thus effectively cancelling the constraint to growth represented by the original SF. It also requires that the new, restructured & more sophisticated high tech sector which emerges from this first round of policy making and policy impact be capable of exploiting a new set of opportunities that exogenously makes its appearance--provided a suitable policy response is found to a new System Failure that stands in its way.
Israel's experience suggests that a virtuous co-evolutionary process may require i) a specialized policy institution in charge of national ITP (like Israel's OCS); ii) strong accumulation of 'policy capabilities' through time; and iii) a political process such that the aforementioned agency not be captured by private interests and lobbies 30 .
In Israel ITP-high tech co-evolution started during the background conditions' phase and continued during the pre-emergence, and emergence phases. It underlies and underpins the finance-high tech and other more specific co-evolutionary processes touched upon previously. More importantly, it explains why the SF which triggered Yozma was identified and why such an acceptable policy response was 29 After 1993 both VC and SU co-evolved with other elements of the high tech cluster the combined effect of which was VC emergence and the transformation of high tech. 30 The possibility of 'regulatory capture' has been raised in the literature e.g. by Lerner 1999 Source : 
Lessons from the Israeli Case and Types/Causes of VC Policy Failure
Abandoning the view that VC is a pool of capital and adopting a ILC perspective to the evolution of theVC industry has a number of important implications for VC policies not only in Israel but also elsewhere 35 . These include 
Policy Failures roughly match PLC phases
We will deal with each one of the above points separately. 32 The role and justification of government policy in the context of strong background conditions and market forces is analyzed in Avnimelech and Teubal 2003d. 33 The Inbal program had sharpened policy makers' view that LP was the right form of VC companies. 34 An important point to recognize is that the failures that spurred Israeli policy-makers to transform the System of innovation were not only market but system failures (Metcalfe 1996 , Teubal 1998 ). The fundamental weakness or insufficiency was not under-investment by market forces; it rather was the lack of innovation capabilities & links in Phase1; and of a VC industry in Phase3. 35 Some of these are also the result of a systematic comparison between the Israeli and the US cases, see ATK 2003.
The Centrality & Complexity of VC emergence policies
The central event in the VC industry's ILC is "VC Emergence. Whenever VC- This is a formidable task: it complicates the structure of incentives; and it requires policy makers to take account of a wide range of other factors not directly linked to incentives. Moreover, achieving critical mass is not enough; additional conditions might have to be fulfilled for a subsequent 'cumulative VC emergence process' to take place. This may call for not only appropriate principles of 'design' and timing of VC policies but also appropriate principles of policy implementation.
Even with respect to incentives -supposedly an area where professionals have much knowledge-the fact that these should induce the creation of a critical mass of capabilities (where 'quality' rather than quantity is critical) and not only a critical mass of financial resources, might considerably complicate design. Thus to effectively taking care of a) and b) above may require direct Government equity investments in VCs (fund of fund role) plus other provisions such as offering a 'buy option' to 36 A distinction should be made between 'targeting' industries or technologies and 'picking winners' which might support particular or specific commercial products (Stoneman 1987, p.216) or specific companies. Nelson 1984 in his study of high technology policies in five nations argues that Japanese MITI type projects aimed at creating a commercially competitive industry have been relatively successful, while government involvement or partnership in the development design and production of particular commercial products seems to be fraught with difficulties and dangers and often leads to failure (this is also Stoneman's opinion The latter also requires that Government investments induce at least a critical mass of VC activity which triggers collective learning & continued growth of VC activity (through new entry and growth of incumbents) during a certain period. 40 For example early successes from early entrants will induce new entrants and even greater successes and so forth. The increased industry size in turn will induce collective learning ('dynamic economies of scale') and potentially lead to even greater increases in efficiency and volume of activity. Materializing the potential for collective 37 This would provide strong incentives to the upside which is an important factor inducing entry of highly skilled agents who are capable, through significant adding value activities, of managing and profiting from high return, high risk investments such as early phase investments in high tech SU. 38 The set of skilled entrepreneurs and investors lined up may also depend crucially on whether there exists a possibility of selecting groups that will benefit from the Government program (in Israel, of being assigned 'Yozma Fund' status); and whether policy makers are sufficiently skilled and networked to make the right choices. 39 Agglomeration Economies seems to be a 'flow concept' which means that they may disappear if the number of firms in a particular area declines. While these are important factors, the processes of cluster dynamics must also consider the accumulation of capabilities (a 'stock' variable) and other factors such as 'Reputation' and 'External Links'(which are not directly dependent on the number of firms in the cluster). Moreover, these capabilities both affect agglomeration costs and benefits and also the 'carrying capacity' of the cluster. 40 Achieving critical mass is important for inducing, through a number of dynamic processes, a cumulative process of growth and development of the fledging VC industry. In fact, critical mass should be defined in terms of this objective. The desired speed of VC emergence is an important factor.
learning, however, may require new institutions far sharing information and even for investment coordination.
The upshot is that VC emergence policies are considerably more sophisticated than the conventional set of measures recommended to increase the flow of financial VC. 41 We have emphasized some of the virtues of direct Government investments in VC (like in the Yozma program); but the use of these either alone or in conjunction with tax benefits, equity guarantees, and/or regulatory changes even if necessary are not sufficient for successfully emergence of a sophisticated, early phase & high tech SU-oriented Venture Capital industry. To be successful Governments must also be able to assess and even to influence the context under which the VC emergence policies will be implemented. These will affect the timing of VC emergence policies and other Government action, particularly when background conditions have not yet matured and when external conditions are not right.
5.2Post-emergence VC-relevant policies may be justified
The task of policy need not end with a successful VC emergence process since new System Failures may pop up and stand in the way of a successful post-crisis restructuring and consolidation process. However, with the possible exception of policies for VC consolidation-post emergence policies will probably be "milder" or less radical than targeted VC-directed policies oriented to VC emergence since the industry and markets already exist. The 'static' distortion they would create would be lower than that created by a targeted program directed to VC emergence; and so are their cost in terms of Government disbursements. These policies will be termed 'VC industry specific policies' and should be clearly distinguished from Targeted VC emergence policies. Their potential justification follows from an Evolutionary
Perspective to Economic Change which, by virtue of its emphasis on dynamics, capabilities and persistent heterogeneity of agents (Nelson & Winter 1982 , Metcalfe 1994 , Coriat & Dosi 1998 among others)-naturally emphasizes the specificities of each sector. Their justification is more likely in countries in which, like the US and Israel, high tech is a key driver of economic growth. This contrasts with targeted policies which should be implemented, if at all, only 'once in a decade' 42 .
A typology of Policy Failures 43 that matches Industry Life Cycle phases
The Israeli case (which we know best) and to some extent the US (AKT 2003) and the Indian cases (D&K2001, A&T 2003e) suggests a set of possible failures in the implementation of VC policies. For countries were VC emergence is likely to be policy led and in contexts were targeted VC policies are both feasible and desirablethere are six possible causes of such failure. All of these may be present under a 'VC as pool of money' perspective and some may also be present under the alternative "VC as an industry' perspective (e.g. due to the complexity of policy as discussed above)
. We now proceed to analyze each one of them.
Failure 1 (F1) -Unfavorable Background Conditions Prevailed when VC policies were implemented
We argued that VC policy should not be the main policy used to create a high tech industry but may be relevant once that industry attains a certain size; and we also based this contention through our analysis of Israel's VC industry. It follows that a significantly earlier implementation of Yozma (e.g. during the 70s) would have failed e.g. due to the scarcity of Innovation Capabilities in the Business Sector; and due to the low number of pre-existing SU. F1 involves a timing problem with respect to VC emergence. Since, under these circumstances it is not possible to identify the ideal design for the VC policy and any targeted VC policy wouldn't be effective, it is inappropriate to link F1 with an inappropriate design. Rather than VC-directed or VC-emergence policies other ITP must be implemented during this phase. Thus it is 42 The distinction between targeted & (other) VC industry specific policies is also important due to the continued adaptation required of an already established VC industry -a result of changes in the environment & the likelihood that System & Market Failures could block autonomous, unaided adaptation. 43 The term 'policy failure' indicates an inadequate policy response to a market or system failure. It is related to J. Stiglitz's concept of 'Government Failure' (Stiglitz 1988, p.5) . After recognizing that 'market failure led to the major government programs of the 1930s and 1960s' Stiglitz asks the question "under what conditions will government programs not work well". While his is not an explicit evolutionary approach his four reasons are related to three of the failures we will be analyzing (F2,F3,F4) . In the economics literature there is another notion of Government failure: government action not oriented to overcoming a 'market failure' which creates a distortion in the system (related to F1).
no surprise that the VC policies implemented by India in the late 80s & early 90s
failed to create a VC industry 44 .
In Israel the policies implemented during the 'background conditions' phase included the OCS R&D Grants scheme; and in the US during the late 50s and 60s-- 
Industry Life Cycle
An Industry Life Cycle model is a particular variant and extension of the classical PLC model (Abernathy & Utterback 1978 , Klepper 1996 Klepper 2000) which considers both aspects of dynamic/evolutionary processes and/or institutional perspectives (including issues of organizational capabilities). Our Industry Life Cycle framework differs from conventional PLC theory in three respects. First, the industry we refer to when crafting the theory is the VC industry rather than the automobile (or other industry), which stood in the background of the early PLC theory development.
Thus the inherent cyclical nature of VC is explicitly considered in the model (crisis, and restructuring/consolidation phases) and related to Israel's and to some extent the US experience. Moreover, the context is that of a country were High Tech is a dominant sector or an important 'driver' of economic growth; and of a VC emergence process that takes place during a global IT Revolution. This links the life cycle analysis to the analysis of Technological Revolutions (Freeman & Peres 1988 , Peres 2003 ; and requires an explicit consideration of High Tech-VC co-evolution. The analytical focus of this paper is on VC industry emergence. This derives both from the view that VC is an industry and from the evolutionary perspective adopted. It differs from the analysis of VC in the literature which focuses on the 'operation' of VC rather than on the dynamics of evolution of the industry; and where frequently VC is considered as a 'pool of money' rather than an 'industry'.
Successful VC emergence is concerned a) with early entry and the dynamic benefits brought about by this process b)with a cumulative process which we intuitively associate with successful VC & high tech cluster emergence processes; and c) with co-evolutionary processes which are likely to underpin cumulativeness. Successful 'targeted' VC emergence policy-a central part of the emergence story in Israeldepends not only in understanding the role of Government in sparking entry of private capital, but also its direct and indirect role in initiating the above-mentioned cumulative process. Our in-depth analysis of this phase focuses on several critical coevolutionary processes including High Tech-VC, VC-SU co-evolution & policybusiness co-evolution. At the policy level it focuses on the two targeted VC policies implemented in Israel during the early 1990s: the early Inbal program which failed; and the later Yozma program which succeeded.
Concerning post-emergence processes, the Israeli and U.S. cases suggests that there may be endogenous reasons why a VC industry that emerges will experience a post-emergence crisis. For example the new industry and the associated high tech cluster may not 'fit' will within the overall system; or there may have been 'overshooting' or a downturn in the global industry/market. The process of overcoming this crisis and the reconfiguration of the high tech cluster, will determine the sustainability of the industry and its future strength. We believe that an important element in this restructuring process is adjusting to the changing role of the high tech cluster & VC industry within the wider social-economic system. As part of this the diffusion of technologies and managerial capabilities from the high tech sector toward other sectors and the release of social tension both within the high tech cluster & between the cluster and other agents in the economy.
Policy
The significant of an early phase, high tech SU oriented VC industry as a component of the 'Silicon Valley' model of high tech led many countries to implement government policies aimed at creating a VC industry. Most of these failed.
We argue that most of these failures are due to the simplistic attitude of policy makers toward the creation of a VC industry. More specifically, we argue that policy makers of non-US OECD countries and frequently academic researchers in the field viewed the VC market as a 'pool of capital' rather than an industry. In many cases issues of capabilities, VC organization, links between high tech and VC, and etc., were ignored.
Moreover market failures rather than the system failure were considered the main obstacle to the creation of the industry. This paper's analysis suggests that effective VC emergence policies require adoption of an evolutionary perspective to VC as an industry and a systems/evolutionary perspective to VC policy.
The Israeli experience shows that a targeted VC Emergence policy is feasible and could be desirable. It also shows that it could be a central vector in the reconfiguration of high tech towards a SU-intensive cluster. Also suggests that such a policy could be more complex both in design and implementation than most VC policies of OECD countries excluding the US (see for example OECD 1996 OECD , 1997 OECD , 2000 OECD , 2003 . The policy requires a strong sensitivity to context and timing, and greater coordination with other policies. Success depends on characteristics of an evolutionary process which converged, with the help of policy, into a successful VC emergence process. Rather than elucidating a 'critical set of success factors' our analysis emphasizes the importance of background conditions and pre-emergence events both in terms of high tech industry capabilities and links (technological, organizational, managerial) and in terms of policy capabilities and institutions.
Israel's policy-led VC emergence process of 1993-9 was triggered by the 
Applicability
The Israeli experience is not directly replicable elsewhere. What can be adopted are specific aspects both of the analytical approach followed in this paper and of the policies implemented. VC emergence policies are complex and their design and implementation require a rare combination of broad perspective on the one hand and attention to detail on the other. In the concluding section we have identified six cases of VC policy failure. Despite this and due to our enhanced understanding of past experience, an increasing number of countries may be poised to attempt a second round of VC policies; and their chances of succeeding would seem to be at least as great as those of past policies, if not greater.
